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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
LIMITATION ON DOCTRINE OF STARE DEcISIS IN DECISIONS OF
DIVIDED COURT.-The recent Georgia supreme court case of Scar-
borough v. Houston' introduces a seemingly startling innovation
into the doctrine of stare decisis. In choosing between two clearly
conflicting precedents, the court followed the earlier one upon the
ground that it was concurred in by the full bench of six justices,
whereas to the later decision one justice dissented. However, in-
vestigation discloses that this doctrine is of legislative rather than
judicial creation. The Georgia Civil Code of 1910 provides:
"Unanimous decisions rendered after said date by a full bench
of six shall not be overruled or materially modified except with
the concurrence of six Justices, and then after argument had, in
which the decision by permission of the court is expressly ques-
tioned and reviewed; and after such argument, the court in its
decision shall state distinctly whether it affirms, reverses, or
changes such decision. '"2 This unique statutory provision has
been given effect by an unbroken line of Georgia decisions.3
This doctrine of legislative limitation of the freedom of the
judiciary to establish precedents appears to be without parallel
in other jurisdictions. The nearest approach to it is the gener-
ally accepted rule that where a court is evenly divided in opinion,
the judgment of the lower court is affirmed and stands as the
decision in the particular case, but does not constitute a pre-
cedent.4 Generally, it is the rule that a deliberate decision of the
highest court of a state, although pronounced by a divided court,
must be considered as stare decisis upon the questions involved.
These rules, of course, are rules of the courts and not of the
legislatures.
Since the doctrine of stare decisis is one of judicial growth
1 175 S. E. 491 (1934).
2 Sec. 6207, quoted in part.
3 Josey v. State, 148 Ga. 488, 96 S. E. 1041 (1918) ; Killingsworth v. Killings-
worth, 148 Ga. 590, 97 S. E. 539 (1918) ; Kennemer v. State, 154 Ga. 139, 113
S. E. 551 (1922) ; Tucker v. Wimpey, 155 Ga. 118, 116 S. E. 315 (1923) ; Basil
v. State, 22 Ga. App. 765, 97 S. E. 259 (1918) ; Allen v. Montgomery, 25 Ga.
App. 817, 105 S. E. 33 (1920).
4 Hertz v. Woodman, 30 S. Ct. 621, 218 U. S. 205, 54 L. Ed. 1001 (1909);
Westhus v. Union Trust Co. of St. Louis, 94 C. C. A. (Mo.) 95, 168 F. 617
(1909), City of Kalamazoo v. Crawford, 154 Mich. 58, 117 N. W. 572, 16 Ann.
Cas. 110 (1908) ; Gourlay v. Insurance Co. of North America, 189 Mich. 384,
155 N. W. 483 (1915) ; Kangas v. New York Life Insurance Co., 223 Mich.
238, 193 N. W. 867 (1923) ; Rowley v. Hager, 63 Or. 246, 127 P. 36 (1912);
Territory v. Gaines, 11 Ariz. 270, 93 P. 281 (1908) ; Snipes v. Davis, 131 S. C.
298, 127 S. E. 447 (1925) ; Jenkins v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 187 N. C. 864, 123
S. E. 82 (1924).
5 L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayer's Benevolent & Protective Union
No. 3, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1239 (1908); Mur-
ray v. Newmyer, 66 Colo. 459, 182 P. 888 (1919) ; Runnells v. Leffel, 105 Or.
346, 207 P. 867 (1922) ; Tate v. Lenhardt, 110 S. C. 569, 96 S. E. 720 (1918).
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rather than of legislative enactment, on general principles of
constitutionality, one cannot but wonder if the Georgia statute
is constitutional. It does not lay down a mere rule of procedure,
but rather a positive rule of decision, purporting to bind the
supreme judicial tribunal of the state. As such it seems a direct
invasion by the legislature of the judicial department of gov-
ernment. Although, so far as the writer can discover, the con-
stitutionality of the statute has not as yet been raised, one
rather ingenious explanation is suggested by the Georgia Court
of Appeals6 in declaring that a decision by the full bench, not
overruled "speaks with the full force and effect of a statute,
and supersedes subsequent rulings in conflict with it." If, how-
ever, the provision is to be justified as simply adopting in ad-
vance decisions of the Supreme Court and giving to them the
effects of statutes, one cannot but wonder if this might not con-
stitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The present
statute must be clearly distinguished from those adopting com-
mon law precedents or statutory interpretations of other juris-
dictions. In such statutes the adoption is of past decisions; the
present statute would constitute blind adoption of future de-
cisions.
However, with the tendency of the courts to distinguish pre-
vious cases rather than to overrule them, the constitutionality
of the statute will probably never be directly questioned. Any
significance the provision may have is as a powerful manifesta-
tion of the tendency-often so futilely expressed-to lend cer-
tainty to the law. Withal, one may conclude that the doctrine
enunciated will continue to be the law and to be followed as
such in Georgia.
SPEED OF RAILROAD TRAINS AS NEGLIGENE.-When we have
our attention directed to the not-so-distant past when a railroad
company was held to be grossly negligent for not stopping an
already slowly moving train and chasing a herd of cattle off
of its right of way;1 when a switch engine going six miles per
hour was held by a jury to be going at a grossly careless and
negligent rate of speed; 2 when city ordinances limiting the speed
of railroad trains to four,3 five,4 six, eight, and ten,5 miles per
6 Allen v. Montgomery, 25 Ga. App. 817, 105 S. E. 33 (1920).
1Illinois Central Railroad v. Baker, 47 Ill. 295 (1868). But see C. B. & Q.
R. R. Co. v. Damerell, 81 Ill. 450 (1876), in which it was held that a train
was not obliged to stop in order to keep from hitting a team of horses that
was on the track a long way off.
2 Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 70 Ill. 211 (1873).
8Wheaton v. City of Franklin, 34 Ind. 392 (1870).
4 C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dougherty, 12 I1. App. 181 (1882).
5 Duggan v. P. D. & E. Ry. Co., 42 IIl. App. 536 (1891); City of Lake View
v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247 (1889) ; Larkin v. Burlington, 85 Iowa 492, 52 N. W. 480
(1894) ; the cases also show similar ordinances in Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York.
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hour within their city limits were held to be valid and reason-
able measures for the public safety; when a railroad company
was grossly negligent in allowing its trains to be run past a
crossing at a rate of speed of from twenty-five to thirty miles
per hour,6 such a decision as that recently handed down by the
Supreme Court of Illinois (Mr. Justice Shaw) in the case of
Provenzano v. The Illinois Central Railroad Company,7 seems to
come from a different world. That case definitely finds that a
rate of speed of sixty miles per hour is not such as amounts to
willful and wanton conduct on the part of the defendant or even
that it is grossly negligent. The accident in that case occurred
at noon on a bright day at the main intersection in the town of
Hillside. The testimony was conflicting as to whether or not the
whistle and bell were sounded, but the jury found that they were.
As cited cases show, there has been a distinct trend in the
decisions of the various courts of this country to sanction in-
creased speeds of our passenger railroads. But in spite of such
trend the action of the different states has not been uniform.
In Illinois in 1873, ten miles per hour was held to be a grossly
unsafe rate of speed through a city, the court saying, "It would
appear to the minds of all prudent persons that such a rate
of speed, at such a place, is reckless, and in total disregard of
human life. All must know that it is hazardous almost in the
extreme. If such conduct were not attended with disaster, it
would be a matter of surprise. . . . Any and all persons would
say that it would be reckless for an individual to drive his horses
through the thronged streets of a large and populous city at such
a rate of speed; and yet he would have his horses under more
prompt and immediate control than an engine and train can
ever be brought. The individual could check his team on shorter
space, and could readily turn it in its course, and thus afford
some means of avoiding injury to pedestrians. "s In 1883, thirty-
five miles per hour was held not to be negligence as a matter
of law,9 apparently a relaxation; but in 1896 it was held to be
negligence to go twenty miles per hour through a thickly settled
6 Reeves v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 30 Pa. St. 454 (1858). See also those
cases in which it was held that the mere fact that the train was going faster
than the ordinance allowed did not amount to gross negligence; Blanchard v.
L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 126 Ill. 416 (1888) ; L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Bodemer,
139 Ill. 596 (1889) ; Ill. C. R. R. Co. v. Eicher, 202 111. 556 (1903). In Wabash
Ry. Co. v. Henks, 91 111. 406 (1879), although the speed at which the train
was running was not mentioned, the court held that the mere fact that the
train was going faster than the law allowed did not amount to the doing of a
willful act. The court also said that though the statute allowed trains to go
faster than ten miles per hour, that did not mean that they could go faster than
that all the time.
7 357 Ill. 192.
8 P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Knutson, Admx., 69 fI1. 103 (1873).
9W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hicks, 13 Ill. App. 407 (1883).
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part of the city.lo New York seems to have been a bit faster than
the rest of the country, for in 1891 it was held to be all right
to go thirty miles per hour through a town (if there were
gates)," and fifty-five to sixty was held not to be negligence
per se through the country.' 2 Michigan made a similar decision
concerning a speed of twenty-five miles per hour in 1894.'- About
the same time a Federal court held that forty to forty-five miles
per hour was not excessive if the whistle or bell could be heard
at least a mile,' 4 while Kentucky held that it was negligence
to go thirty miles per hour if there were no bell or
whistle;' 5 and Alabama felt it had taken a step forward by find-
ing that a railroad could not be held to have a willful intent to
injure persons just because it went fifteen to twenty miles per
hour, even if it did so with no bell or whistle.' 6 In 1896 Arkansas
10 C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ohlsson, 70 Ill. App. 487 (1896).
11 Haywood v. New York Central R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. S. 177 (1891).
12 Dubois v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. S. 279 (1895). In
the following cases it was held that no particular speed at crossings is negli-
gence per se: Chi. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Campbell, 34 Colo. 380, 83 P. 138 (1905);
Dyson v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 57 Conn. 9, 17 A. 137 (1888) ; Freedman
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 81 Conn. 601, 71 A. 901 (1909) ; Lake Shore
& M. S. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 166 Ind. 7, 76 N. E. 629 (1906); Bruggeman v.
Ill. Cent. R. Co., 147 Iowa 187, 123 N. W. 1007 (1909) ; Atchison, etc. Ry.
Co. v. Schriver, 80 Kan. 540, 103 P. 994 (1909) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Engleman's Admr., 135 Ky. 515, 122 S. W. 833 (1909) ; Folkmire v. Michigan
United Rys. Co., 157 Mich. 159, 121 N. W. 811 (1909) ; McDonald v. Inter-
national & G. N. Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 1, 22 S. W. 939 (1893). See also notes in 9
L. R. A. (N. S.) 373, and Ann. Cas. 1914 B. 602. On the same subject see
also Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 90 Or. 490, 176 P. 594
(1918); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Nichols, 130 N. E. 546 (Ind. App.
1921) ; Schaff v. Young, 264 S. W. 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). But in I. B. &
W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 106 Ill. 371 (1883), the court held that fifty miles per
hour was not negligence per se, very much like the principal case under
discussion.
1sTobias v. Michigan Central R. Co., 103 Mich. 330, 61 N. W. 514 (1894).
14 Griffin v. B. & 0. R. Co., 44 F. 574 (1890). And in Hoskins v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Mont. 394, 102 P. 988 (1909), it was held that forty-five
miles per hour was not per se excessive even though the train was at the
time going faster than the schedule called for.
15 Louisville, Cincinnati & Lexington R. Co. v. Goetz, Adm'x, 79 Ky. 442
(1881).
16Georgia Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lee, 92 Ala. 262, 9 So. 230 (1891). In Part-
low v. Illinois Central R. Co., 150 Il. 321 (1894), it was held that a speed
as high as forty miles per hour was not negligence per se and was not wanton;
and in Passwaters v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 181 Ill. App. 44 (1913), the
court went even further and said that fifty-five to sixty miles per hour was
not negligence per se or wanton. One of the few cases where it was found
that the railroad company was guilty of wanton conduct for allowing its
trains to be driven at a high rate of speed is Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Smith,
153 Ala. 127, 45 So. 57 (1907), hut there there was the additional feature that
the railroad, or person in charge of the train, knew of the particular peril to
passers-by.
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held that thirty miles per hour was not negligence,17 Massa-
chusetts held that forty miles per hour might be unreasonable
depending upon the crossing,' 8 but Texas gave us the interesting
advice that running backwards at the rate of fifteen miles per
lhour is grossly negligent conduct. 19
In all of these cases the courts have tried quite carefully to
balance the duties of pedestrians and the need of the public for
a more safe and yet rapid system of transportation. It makes
us wonder with no small degree of apprehension what the
result of the use of streamlined trains going eighty or one hun-
dred miles an hour will be on the future court decisions. Will
they say that such a speed is extremely excessive and unsafe to
the public; will they require the railroad companies to install
more safety devices; or will they say that the pedestrian must
use a higher degree of care for his own safety when crossing
the railroad rights of way?
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN ACTION AGAINST A MUNI-
CIPALITY.-In the recent Ohio case of Felt v. City of Toledo,'
a young child of seven years of age was playing in a public
playground in the city of Toledo, a playground operated and
controlled by the city for the use and enjoyment of the public.
While sliding down one of the slides in the park, she caught her
foot between the steel plates of the sliding surface, which had
become spread apart through some cause unknown, and was
thrown to the ground and suffered severe injuries therefrom. In
the subsequent action against the city, the plaintiff attempted
to rely upon the doctrine or res ipsa loquitur, and rested its
case after proving the injury and the operation and control of
the park by the city. The court held that the doctrine did not
apply and that the city could only be liable upon proof of notice
of the defect and negligence in not repairing it. The decision was
not expressly grounded upon the fact that the city was a muni-
cipal corporation and that the doctrine did not apply for that
17 St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Denty, 63 Ark. 177, 37 S. W. 719 (1896). And
see Chi. and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132 (1889), where it
was held that a speed of thirty to thirty-five miles per hour was evidence
of gross negligence.
18 Hicks v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 164 Mass. 424, 41 N. E. 721
(1895). But when a railroad takes all necessary precautions and gives proper
warnings to prevent strangers from being injured at crossings, it seems that
a recovery cannot be based on the speed of the train alone. Cincinnati, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 712, 104 S. W. 771 (1907); Newhard v.
Penn. R. Co., 153 Pa. St. 417, 26 A. 105 (1893). Note in 7 Ann. Cas. 991.
Unless there is some special peril, as a thunder storm, etc., Freedman v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 81 Conn. 601.
19 Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 697, 39 S. W. 140
(1896).
1192 N. E. 11 (Ohio, 1934).
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reason, nor upon any rule of pleading in that state which pre-
cluded the application of the doctrine when any proof of negli-
gence is established. The only reason given by the court for its
decision was simply that "since the decision of the Supreme
Court, in City of Cleveland v. Pine, 123 Ohio St. 578, there can
be no foundation for such claim." We must look, therefore, to
the latter case for its reasons.
In that case the plaintiff sued for loss of his wife's services,
which loss, he said, was caused by injuries sustained by her when,'
in a public park, a manhole on which she stepped gave way be-
neath her weight. The plaintiff relied on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to sustain his case, but the court held that the doctrine
did not apply because of a statute (Section 3714, General Code)
which put parks in the same category as streets and sidewalks,
and held that because they are instrumentalities of government
the city can only be liable for negligent acts in regard to them
when either actual or constructive notice is shown. It then said
that the existence of such knowledge or notice is a question of
fact for the jury. What the decision would be in the absence of
such statute we cannot say, but in Ohio, at any rate, because of
the statute, res ipsa loquitur cannot be asserted against a muni-
cipality in a case like the present.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur whenever a thing which
produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and
management of the defendant, and the occurrence is such as in
the ordinary course of events would not happen if due care had
been exercised, the fact of the injury itself will be deemed to
afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence
of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the
injury was not due to his want of care.2  It is a prima facie pre-
sumption of negligence in cases where, in the ordinary course
of events, the accident would not have happened if those in con-
trol of the instrumentality or appliance had used proper care.8
It must clearly be shown that the thing causing the accident was
under the exclusive control of the defendants or his servants. 4
In the absence of a statute controlling the liability of a
municipal corporation, its responsibilities must fall into one of
two distinct categories. If the city, in maintaining a park for
the use and enjoyment of the public can be said to be exercising
2 Hart v. Washington Park Club, 157 I1. 9 (1895) ; Western Transportation
Co. v. Downer, 78 U. S. 129, 20 L. Ed. 160 (1871); Judson v. Giant Powder
Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1895); Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hadley, 170
Ind. 204, 82 N. E. 1025 (1907). Notes: 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 527; 2 L. R. A.
820; 6 Am. St. Rep. 739; 113 Am. St. Rep. 986.
8 Smith v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 160 ll. App. 87 (1911);
Beckwith v. Boynton, 235 Ill. App. 469 (1924) ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341
11. 539 (1930).
4 Schaller v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 225 Ill. 492 (1907).
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a proprietary function, there would then be no distinction be-
tween the city and an individual,5 and the doctrine would prop-
erly apply in the case of an individual. Although there is a
respectable group of authorities which holds that the mere fact
that the defendant is a city is enough to preclude the operation
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and holds that the mere evi-
dence of the happening of an accident is not sufficient. 6 But
what would be the ruling if the city is acting in a governmental
capacity? The general rule seems to be that a municipal cor-
poration is not liable in private actions for injuries resulting
from the exercise of governmental powers, while it is liable in
case of its improper exercise of a power in its private capacity; 7
and there are numerous cases holding that the maintaining of a
public park for the purpose of furnishing to the people at large
a place for free recreation to promote the health and general
welfare of the public, and as a means of adding to the beauty
of a city, is a governmental activity-a public duty-and there-
fore a municipality is not liable for injuries caused through
negligent conditions therein.8 But even this doctrine is not fol-
lowed by all of the courts, many of them holding that the city
is liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in establishing,
5 A municipal corporation owning, leasing, or controlling vacant lots is
chargeable with the same duties and obligations which devolve upon individuals
in respect to their conditions. City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141 (1895).
And the same doctrine is held applicable in City of Chicago v. O'Brennan, 65
Ill. 160 (1872), where the municipal corporation was in exclusive possession
of the property for the benefit of the public.
6 In any event, however, a city or town is liable in such cases (where parks
are maintained by the city in its private capacity) only upon proof of negli-
gence; mere evidence of the happening of an accident is not sufficient. City of
Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 P. 590 (1905), (fall of a stand) ; McFraw
v. Dist. of Columbia, 3 App. Cas. 405, (bathing beach water of uneven depth)
Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234 (1875), (fall of bust at municipal concert)
Carey v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S. W. 438 (1905), (child drowned in
reservoir in park surrounded by a fence) ; Melker v. City of New York, 190
N. Y. 481, 83 N. E. 565 (1908), (fireworks). Notes: 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147;
7 Ann. Cas. 1042; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 621.
7 City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371 (1897) ; City of Chicago v. Williams,
182 Ill. 135 (1899); Elmore v. Drainage Comrs., 135 111. 269 (1890); Eastern
Ill. State Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271 Il. 602 (1916) ; Hanrahan
v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. 400 (1919); Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill.
494 (1913).
8 Emmons v. City of Virginia, 152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561 (1922) ; Harper
v. City of Topeka, 92 Kan. 11, 139 P. 1018 (1914) ; 29 A. L. R. 860 and note.
A municipal corporation maintaining a playground will be liable for the
death of a child through the fall of a swing caused by disrepair to the appli-
ances by which it was anchored to the ground so that the swing is liable to
tip over when used. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 P. 710
(1925), 42 A. L. R. 245 and note. A city must exercise reasonable care in
construction and maintenance of mechanical appliances used in park operated
for public and is liable for injuries caused by a breach of such duties. Warden
v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375 (1925).
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equipping, and maintaining a public park of the nature under
consideration.9 Therefore it is clear that even the strict rule in
reference to a governmental function has been modified in many
of the states. In none of the cases cited is it definitely decided
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be raised against
a municipal corporation, nor have any been found in which the
question has been passed upon.
The only statutory provision in Illinois in regard to actions
for personal injuries brought against a municipality is found in
Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes (1933), Chapter 70, paragraphs
6-8.1o
The Supreme Court has not interpreted this statute to mean
that res ipsa loquitur may not be raised against a municipal
corporation; and, in fact, there seem to be no cases in which
the point has been directly decided. Therefore, it is still an open
question in Illinois whether, where the facts are such as to jus-
tify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a suit
9 Norberg v. Hagna, 46 S. D. 568, 195 N. W. 438 (1923).
In Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 174, 133 P. 1040 (1913), in an action against
the city for injuries to a child playing on a merry-go-round, evidence held to
sustain the finding that the city maintained the appliance in a defective con-
dition. And see City of Flora v. Pruett, 81 111. App. 161 (1898), where the
defendent city maintained a park in one corner of which it had piled lumber
so stacked that it leaned and was in danger of falling. Against the lumber
the defendant leaned a heavy timber, and boys climbing thereupon pushed
the lumber upon plaintiff's intestate, killing him. Held that defendant was
liable.
And the general rule seems to be that whether or not the city was negligent
in maintaining a park or public place is held to be a question for the jury.
Woodward v. City of Des Moines, 182 Iowa 1102, 165 N. W. 313 (1917) ; Nel-
son v. City of Duluth, 172 Minn. 76, 214 N. W. 774 (1927) ; Capp v. City of
St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913).
10 These paragraphs, which are Laws of 1905, p. 111, sees. 1, 2 and 3, read:
6. Suits to be commenced within one year. No suit or action at law shall be
brought or commenced in any court within this state for damages against any
incorporated city, village or town by any person for an injury to his person
unless such suit or action be commenced within one year from the time such
injury was received or the cause of action accrued.
7. Notice of suit to be filed within six months. Any person who is about to
bring any action or suit at law in any court against any incorporated city, vil-
lage or town for damages on account of "iy personal injury shall, within six
months from the date of injury, or when the cause of action accrued, either by
himself, agent or attorney, file in the office of the city attorney (if there is a
city attorney, and also in the office of the city clerk) a statement in writing,
signed by such person, his agent or attorney, giving the name of the person
to whom such cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of person
injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location
where such accident occurred, and the name and address of the attending phy-
sician (if any).
8. Dismissal of suit for failure to file notice. If the notice provided for by
section two of this act shall not be filed as provided in said section two, then
any such suit brought against any such city shall be dismissed and the person
to whom any such cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be
forever barred from further suing.
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against an individual, the right to rely on the doctrine will be
denied when the suit is against a municipal corporation.
COMPETENCY OF ATTORNEY TO GIvE EXPERT TESTIMONY RE-
GARDING NEGLIGENCE OF ANOTHER ATTORNEY.-The recent case
of Olson v. North' permitted an attorney as a witness to answer
a hypothetical question concerning the negligence of another
attorney in a prior case. While there is abundant authority that
doctors and scientists may testify as experts, few cases are found
which touch upon the competency of attorneys as expert wit-
nesses.
In Pennsylvania, where the question came up in 1844, the
court held that the testimony of a witness versed in legal affairs
could not be given in evidence, saying, "The proper exercise
of such discretion depends not on technical skill, and it is there-
fore not a subject for the opinion of an expert. ' '2 A like de-
cision was given in New York in 1858 in Clussman v. Merkles
where the court decided that the opinions of attorneys as to what
constitutes negligence on the part of another attorney in con-
ducting litigation are not admissible, since the subject is not a
proper one for expert testimony. On the other hand in England
in 1862, in the case of Fletcher v. Winter,4 the court found no
difficulty in holding that a testimony of lawyers was admissible
on a question of the negligence of an attorney. The court re-
peated its decision on a second hearing of the case.
In Illinois, in 1892, in Artz v. Robertson,5 the court, citing no
authorities, said, "As to whether work and services performed
in a law suit and money expended by an attorney for his client
has been properly performed and expended according to good
practice in the special profession and occupation of a lawyer are
certainly expert questions, and a lawyer may be called on to
testify to such matters as an expert. It is as much an expert's
question as it would be in case of a physician as to the proper
treatment of disease or wounds and injuries."
There is clearly no weight of authority on this question, but
the Illinois courts have been uniform, and the decisions appear
more readily justified under the general doctrine of opinion
evidence.
A WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE AS A PROPERTY
RIGHT.-In a suit by a wife seeking an injunction to close a gam-
bling house as a common and public nuisance, on the ground
that it deprived her of her husband's support and maintenance,
1276 MI1. App. 457.
2 Livingston v. Cox, 8 Watts & S. 61.
3 16 N. Y. Super. 402.
4 3 F. & F. 138.
5 50 ll. App. 27.
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it was decided that there was not such a property right involved
as to entitle her to the relief sought.1
The decision is one in accord with the general trend of de-
cisions of the Illinois courts. The court found that the plaintiff
was seeking to enjoin a public nuisance, and that, without show-
ing an injury to a property right and a peculiar damage to her-
self, she could have no relief in equity but must follow the
statutory remedy.2 The court could not find any precedent show-
ing that a wife's right to support and maintenance was a prop-
erty right and therefore refused to take jurisdiction to restrain
a mere criminal or immoral act.
Just what is a property right as to be protected by a court
of equity, is a question that has confronted courts of equity since
1818, when, in Gee v. Pritchard,4 Lord Eldon, by a dictum, in-
corporated into the law the doctrine that equity protects only
property rights. While continually adhering to this principle,
the courts of equity have extended the idea of a property right
until in many cases a mere personal right is protected.
The question whether a wife's right to maintenance and sup-
port would be included in this extended doctrine, would be
answered differently by the various jurisdictions. Certainly
some of the decisions infer that such a right exists as a prop-
erty right. In Snedaker v. King5 the majority opinion refused
an injunction to a wife against a woman who was attempting to
alienate the husband's affections. The decision was based on
the feasibility of enforcing such an injunction, ignoring the ques-
tion of property right. There were two very powerful dissent-
ing opinions, however, which discussed the very problem. Judge
Woodward said, "A contract right has uniformly been held to
be a property right, and it has further been held that inducing
a breach of such a contract is an actionable tort. While injunc-
tion does not lie in all such cases, it is very generally held that
an injunction will lie to restrain third persons from inducing the
breach of a lawful contract by one of the parties thereto, when
it will result in irreparable injury. . . . These principles have
been uniformly enforced in labor strikes. 6 . . .Surely the rights
1 Koch v. McClugage, 276 Ill. App. 512 (1934).
2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 38, pars. 148 and 149.
3 Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237 (1875) ; Hoyt v. McLaughlin, 250 Ill. 442
(1911) ; People v. Condon, 102 I1. App. 449 (1902) ; Stead v. Fortner. 255 Ill.
468 (1912) ; Earp v. Lee, 71 111. 193 (1873) ; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v.
Cheevers, 149 111. 430 1894).
42 Swans. 403 (Eng. 1818).
5 111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
of an employer to the fruits of his contract with his employees
are no more sacred than the rights of a wife to the consortium
and support of her lawful husband."
In the foregoing case the plaintiff had not shown any pecuni-
ary damage. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 7 lends support
to the probable extention of Judge Woodward's reasoning to
the presefit case, as is shown from the following quotation:
"Where the injury resulting from the nuisance is, in its nature,
irreparable, as when ... destruction of the means of subsistence
.. .will ensue from the wrongful act .. .courts of equity will
interfere by injunction in furtherance of justice and the violated
rights of property." Cases so holding there is a property right
in the husband's or wife's name are not infrequent.8
Where there is pecuniary damage resulting from the wrongful
use of one's name, it is well established that equity will give
relief.9 In Ex parte Warfield,10 although proceeding under a
statute, a Texas court found a property right in a husband's
right to his wife's services; in fact, this was grounds for taking
the case out of the doctrine of Hodecker v. Striker,1 following
which the courts have refused injunctions to a wife when the
only grounds relied on was a claim of a privacy right in a
name.
The right to enjoin a proposed defamation, 12 to enjoin a com-
petitor from conducting an illegal lottery injuring plaintiff in
his business,18 and the right of a member of a lodge to an injunc-
tion restraining the lodge from illegally selling beer 14 are other
cases in which the equity courts restrained the commission of
illegal and immoral acts.
6 LaFrance Electrical Construction & S. Co. v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local No. 8, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N. E. 899 (1923) ; Trua
v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City C. T.
Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U. S. 229 (1917).
7 (1st Ed.) V, Ch. 21, sec. 478.
8 Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N. W. 482 (1926); Blanc v. Blanc,
47 N. Y. S. 694 (1897); Witts v. Bauderer, 255 S. W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1923) ; Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924) ; Westlake v.
Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (1878); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327,
98 N. E. 102 (1912).
9 Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907); Edison v.
Edison Polyform. Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907) ; State ex
rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924).
1040 Tex. Cr. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899) discussed in 29 Harv. Law
Rev. 675, by Dean Roscoe Pound.
1139 N. Y. S. 515 (1896).
1229 Harv. Law Rev. 690; Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 110 Mo.
492, 19 S. W. 804 (1892).
13 Glow v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927) ; Featherstone v.
Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas, 10 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928).
14 Herald v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289, B. P. 0. E., 46 Cal. App. 325, 189
P. 329 (1920).
